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Members of the Critical Neuroscience initiative raised the question whether the perceived
normative significance of neuroscience is justified by the discipline’s actual possibilities.
In this paper I show how brain research was assigned the ultimate political, social,
and moral authority by some leading researchers who suggested that neuroscientists
should change their research priorities, promising solutions to social challenges in order
to increase research funds. Discussing the two examples of cognitive enhancement
and the neuroscience of (im)moral behavior I argue that there is indeed a gap between
promises and expectations on the one hand and knowledge and applications on the
other. However it would be premature to generalize this to the neurosciences at large,
whose knowledge-producing, innovative, and economic potentials have just recently been
confirmed by political and scientific decision-makers with the financial support for the
Human Brain Project and the BRAIN Initiative. Finally, I discuss two explanations for
the analyzed communication patterns and argue why Critical Neuroscience is necessary,
but not sufficient. A more general Critical Science movement is required to improve the
scientific incentive system.
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“Ideologies, philosophies, religious doctrines, world-models,
value systems, and the like will stand or fall depending on the
kinds of answers that brain research eventually reveals. It all comes
together in the brain” (Sperry, 1981: 4).
In the year Roger W. Sperry received the Nobel Prize for his
research on the functional specialization of the cerebral hemi-
spheres, he expressed worries that the public had lost trust in
science, including his own field: neuroscience. Indeed, an editorial
in Science written by the President (on leave) of the New York Uni-
versity and Deputy Secretary of Energy John C. Sawhill warned of
the negative consequences of a “public disillusionment”, “credi-
bility gap”, and “growing cynicism” about science (Sawhill, 1979).
In Sperry’s view, neuroscientists should change their research
priorities and emphasize the possible social benefits of their
enterprise; this should be easy, he argued, because all political,
social, and philosophical matters were ultimately subjects of brain
research. This shift should allow a fusion of science and religion,
the descriptive and the prescriptive, to overcome global problems
caused by increasing population, pollution, poverty, and energy
demands (Sperry, 1981). Twenty-five years later his former PhD
student Michael S. Gazzaniga would revive this vision in the
introduction of his book “The Ethical Brain” (Gazzaniga, 2005;
see also Schleim, 2005; Schleim and Schirmann, 2011).
In the presidential declaration heralding the “Decade of the
Brain” 10 years after Sperry voiced his concerns, the broad
social potential of the neurosciences was explained with respect
to neurodegenerative diseases as well as the “War on Drugs”.
President George H. W. Bush called “upon all public officials and
the people of the United States to observe that decade with appro-
priate programs, ceremonies, and activities” (Bush, 1990). The
Commission of the European Communities soon followed with
a similar declaration heralding the “European decade of brain
research” (Pandolfi, 1993). Sperry’s fears that the neurosciences
might suffer budget cuts were thus overcome in the 1990s. In
spite of recent investigations of science communication reporting
a raise in “neuroskepticism” in scholarly as well as public reports
on neuroimaging (Rachul and Zarzeczny, 2012; Whiteley, 2012)
and broader analyses into “neuromythology” (Hasler, 2012; Satel
and Lilienfeld, 2013), the political-scientific decisions in 2013
to fund the major research endeavors Human Brain Project and
BRAIN Initiative emphasized that the neurosciences still enjoy
high public confidence in their knowledge-producing capacities
as well as their potential to drive technological innovation and,
not the least, economic growth.
Critical Neuroscience is a young initiative to probe “the extent
to which discussion of neuroscience . . . matches the achievements
and potential of neuroscience itself ”.1 By means of critique and
including interdisciplinary perspectives, its members try to bet-
ter understand the knowledge-producing and -communication
1See the project description on their website (http://www.critical-
neuroscience.org/#1; accessed February 23 2014).
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processes in the neurosciences and its wider ramifications
(Choudhury et al., 2009; Slaby and Choudhury, 2012). Notably,
Jan Slaby asked: “Does neuroscience indeed have such wide-
ranging effects or are we collectively overestimating its impacts
at the expense of other important drivers of social and cultural
change?” (Slaby, 2010: 397). In this paper, I follow a two-fold
strategy to propose a preliminary answer to his question: first, I
skeptically 2 discuss two examples of neuroscience technologies
that would obviously have strong social/normative implications
when applied, namely (1) pharmacological enhancement and (2)
(im)moral neuroscience; second, I relate Critical Neuroscience to
(3) recent critical analyses of the general scientific knowledge-
making and -communication processes.
PROMISES OF PHARMACOLOGICAL ENHANCEMENT
That healthy people use psychoactive substances to influence
their experiences or relations with other people and society was
not new in the early 2000s: besides references to ancient cul-
tural or religious practices, the medical-anthropological inves-
tigation of what Nicolas Rasmussen called “America’s First
Amphetamine Epidemic 1929–1971” provided clear evidence for
this (Rasmussen, 2008a,b). New was framing the phenomenon
in terms of “cognitive enhancement”.3 Indeed, also the Presi-
dent’s Council on Bioethics’s related report “Beyond Therapy:
Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness” published at the
beginning of that decade discussed superior performance exclu-
sively with respect to sports and muscle enhancement (Bioethics
Council, 2003). When addressing the possibility of stimulant
drugs as behavior improvement, they strongly emphasized social-
moral over cognitive alterations, namely, children’s “ability and
willingness to be considerate, show respect, pay attention, carry
out assignments, accept responsibility, deal with stress and disap-
pointment, and practice self-control” (Bioethics Council, 2003:
71). At that time, the drugs that would later be discussed
as possible cognitive enhancement substances by neuroethi-
cists had already been known for years (modafinil) to decades
(amphetamine, methylphenidate).
The sudden emphasis on cognitive performance by scientific
researchers, particularly performance-enhancing behavior of stu-
dents (Farah et al., 2004; Greely et al., 2008), coincided with
political initiatives to define a nation’s value in terms of its citizen’s
“mental capital” (Beddington et al., 2008; Foresight, 2008; see
also Slaby, 2010). Obviously, the science underlying the “mental
wealth of nations” (Beddington et al., 2008), that is, cognitive
neuroscience, became of utmost public importance, because “if
we are to prosper and thrive in our changing society and in
an increasingly interconnected and competitive world, both our
mental and material resources will be vital” (Foresight, 2008: 9).
Notably, the central claim that students increasingly consumed
2Note that skepticism and doubt are often considered as basic norms or values
of science in official declarations of scientific bodies (IAC/IAP, 2012; DFG,
2013).
3An ISI Web of Science topic search for “cognitive enhancement” yields 661
hits with the first incidence in 1986; the 1990s, aggregated, have 51 incidences
or 4.3 annually; the 2000s 274 or 22.9, respectively; the first 4 years of the
2010s already exceed this whole previous decade with 319 incidences or 79.8,
respectively.
stimulant drugs to become better could not be confirmed so
far (Smith and Farah, 2011). It should be considered, though,
that many of the prevalence surveys define enhancement as
mutually exclusive with treatment, excluding consumption as
soon as drugs are medically prescribed. This neglects the pos-
sible interpretation that there actually is an increase in stimu-
lant consumption due to a medicalization of normal or slightly
sub-threshold cognitive performance (Rubin, 2004; Abraham,
2010).4
While stimulant drugs may improve performance of healthy
people in some cognitive tests under laboratory conditions
(Repantis et al., 2010; Smith and Farah, 2011), their benefit in
real-life settings is much less clear. Pharmacologists like Boris B.
Quednow provided theoretical arguments for why we should not
expect too much given the current knowledge of brain function
(Quednow, 2010). For example, just increasing neurotransmitter
levels beyond normal levels is likely to decrease performance.
Quednow’s suggestion to call stimulants “secondary enhancers”
because their effects on cognition seem to be (at least partially)
mediated by enhancing motivation—how people feel about
performance and pressure—is supported by a recent survey of
stimulant consumers’ self-descriptions at an “elite university”
in the USA that identified four emotional patterns: feeling up,
drivenness, interestedness, and enjoyment (Vrecko, 2013). Thus,
“cognitive enhancement” may not be that cognitive, after all.
Even more sobering are two broader observations: first, that
many pharmaceutical companies decided to close their psychi-
atric laboratories because further efforts do not seem to justify
the expected benefits (Amara et al., 2011; van Gerven and Cohen,
2011); second, that even in cases of diagnosed ADHD—thus
in the presence of a therapeutic behavioral-cognitive target—
the prescription of stimulants does not seem to make a lasting
difference to performance (Currie et al., 2013; Sharpe, 2014). If
the prospects of pharmacological research in these therapeutic
contexts are poor, after decades of intensive research and in the
light of developed clinical models, the speculations on the effects
in healthy people seem even more preposterous.
Disturbingly, a recent communication analysis found evidence
that the media are biased towards positive representations of
pharmacological enhancement and an exaggeration of its preva-
lence (Partridge et al., 2011). In line with this research, anecdotal
evidence suggested that scholarly publications by scientific experts
themselves underlie this communication pattern (Schleim, 2010).
This raises the suspicion that the debate keeps reinforcing
itself while lacking strong evidence that the expectations can
be met in the near future. From a communication perspec-
tive it can be a successful attention-maximizing strategy to first
hype a new discovery/development and later debunk it, thus
multiplying the number of reports, a pattern not uncommon
with respect to pharmacological discoveries (Williams et al.,
2008).
4The annual production quotas in the USA increased from 12,700 kg in 2004,
when they were already on a high level, to 49,000 kg in 2014 for amphetamine
and 28,693 kg to 96,750 kg for methylphenidate; that is, almost four-fold for
the former and 3.4-fold for the latter (US Drug Enforcement Administration,
October 2 2013).
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PROMISES OF (IM)MORAL NEUROSCIENCE
Morality in its several facets, what people are doing and why as
well as what they should do, has fascinated thinkers at least since
antiquity (Nadelhoffer et al., 2010). It is common to distinguish
the prescriptive, what should be done, and the descriptive, what
is the case. Philosophers developed arguments that it amounts
to a fallacy to derive a prescription from a pure description
(Moore, 1903). Initially we have seen the two statements by
Sperry and Gazzaniga clearly expressing the idea that descriptive
knowledge of the brain will inform us on what we should do.
Accordingly, Joshua D. Greene and colleagues who confronted
students with descriptions of moral dilemmas in a brain scanner
suggested from the outset that their research could decide the
stalemate position in which, in their view, moral philosophers had
been caught for a long time (Greene et al., 2001, 2004). Their
attempt was twofold, associating (1) utilitarian/consequentialist
judgments favoring the benefit of the greatest number of people
with “cognitive/rational” brain areas (e.g., the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex) and evolutionary recent developments; and (2)
other kinds of judgments favoring people’s intentions or general
principles/duties with “emotional/irrational” brain areas (e.g., the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex and amygdalae) and evolutionary
ancient developments (Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2008). Indeed,
these interpretations were endorsed quickly by moral philoso-
phers arguing that ethical utilitarianism has a rational basis, while
a competing deontological ethics has not (Singer, 2005).
It goes without saying that the association with a certain
brain area or a particular evolutionary stage does not in itself
have any prescriptive force; however, with a rather basic assump-
tion that a moral theory should suffice demands of rationality
the argument becomes complete. Virtually all aspects of the
experiment and its interpretations have been criticized by neu-
roscientists, psychologists, and philosophers alike (e.g., Joyce,
2008; Schleim, 2008; Berker, 2009; Kahane, 2011; Waldmann
et al., 2012). However, for moral neuroscience to become a
scholarly and public communication success (see Figure 1), the
prescriptive/normative claims did not have to be justified; it
was sufficient that they seemed plausible, that it seemed that
science aided by brain scanners has genuinely new ways of
informing or perhaps even deciding philosophical/moral debates
(Schleim, forthcoming).
Generations of anthropologists and moral psychologists before
had gathered evidence on the development, cognitive-emotional
mechanisms, and cultural diversity of morality, but suddenly in
2001 with the publication of the first neuroimaging experiments
the situation seemed to have changed. It seems fair to say that
of the seven different psychological-neuroscientific theoretical
accounts of morality distinguished by Jorge Moll et al., all the
evidence gathered hitherto does not unequivocally favor any par-
ticular one (Moll et al., 2005). While the science communication
accompanying the original study by Greene et al. suggested the
philosophical relevance of the research, even putting forward the
idea that the new findings could make moral philosophers super-
fluous (Helmuth, 2001), so far the opposite has been the case:
theoreticians of all kinds responded to the prescriptive/normative
claims and emphasized how these neuroscientific reports rely on
theoretical presumptions and individual interpretation.
FIGURE 1 | Evidence of the communication success of the original
moral neuroscience studies by Greene et al. from the ISI Web of
Science. The authors were not only the first to present difficult
philosophical moral dilemmas to their subjects in the brain scanner, but
suggested a strong normative significance of their findings, provoking
responses from other scholars. Gray: Greene et al. (2001) (overall 782
citations); black: Greene et al. (2004) (overall 446 citations).
While theoretical in its scope, moral neuroscience is used to
provide the ultimate answers of human right and wrong that
Sperry and Gazzaniga called for. More applied/technical impli-
cations are promised by the complementary research that might
be coined “immoral neuroscience”: the investigation of what
makes us behave immorally or criminally. The historian Peter
Becker suggested that criminal behavior was an essential aspect of
biological/neuroscientific accounts of human beings to emphasize
their social relevance (Becker, 2012). Indeed, journals like Nature
feature detailed reports when neuroscientists provide expert testi-
mony in criminal courts (e.g., Hughes, 2010).5 Recently, Adrian
Raine coined the notion that criminals have “broken brains,
brains that are physically different from those of the rest of us”
(Raine, 2013: 180). Based on the present findings of (im)moral
neuroscience and an optimistic evaluation of future discoveries,
he predicts the development of a new biopsychological screening
and intervening program incorporating extended forms of pre-
ventive detention for the sake of public safety within the next
20–30 years, a proposal certainly calling for more critical scrutiny
elsewhere (Rose, 2010).
CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
With respect to the question raised by Jan Slaby, the examples of
cognitive enhancement and (im)moral neuroscience strongly sug-
gest that notwithstanding the influences of neuro-collaborations
and related funding schemes within academia, we scholars indeed
collectively overestimate the practical and translational social
impact of this research so far. The communicated promises as well
as the scholarly and public attention given to these possibilities
are, in my view, in no way justified by the scientific possibilities. It
goes without saying that this tentative conclusion cannot readily
be generalized to different examples or initiatives like the Human
5See also Nature News of October 30 2009 featuring a murder case in Italy
(http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091030/full/news.2009.1050.html) or the
Nature special “Science in Court” (http://www.nature.com/news/specials/
scienceincourt/index.html), both accessed on February 23 2014.
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FIGURE 2 | The scientific incentive system, simplified. Researchers
compete for scarce places in high-impact science journals and limited research
funds. Their access to these resources is decisive for hiring and, eventually,
tenure decisions at universities or research institutes. The ISI Impact Factor
itself is an arbitrary measure calculated by a commercial company, now owned
by Thomson Reuters, representing the average number of citations of a
journal’s articles in the previous 2 years, a measure originally developed for
librarians. It is used by knowledge and funding institutions to assess scientists’
quality, because it seems to meet the needs of a standardized, easily
comparable, and objective way of assessing research and researchers. Many
scholars believe that this incentive system negatively influences decisions of
scientists, particularly young scholars competing for tenured positions. Figure
created using Microsoftr Clip Art. Used with permission from Microsoft
(http://www.microsoft.com/).
Brain Project or the BRAIN Initiative, although they are likely
to be driven by the same incentive structures. This emphasizes
the importance to raise considerable concerns with respect to
neuroscience communication. In the remainder of this paper I
will thus present two explanations of the found communication
patterns and suggest improvements:
First, particularly with respect to the possibilities and limi-
tations of functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) as a
research tool we could witness exaggerated expectations regard-
ing knowledge about the functioning of the human mind that
were gradually diminished by a focus on biological, psycho-
logical, and statistical limitations (Logothetis, 2008; Vul et al.,
2009; Margulies, 2011). Communication patterns in print media
from 1995–2004 show clear evidence for an overwhelming opti-
mism with respect to the technology’s possibilities (Racine et al.,
2005, 2010), while for the period from 2005–2009, including
online media, the presence of critical reports was emphasized
(Whiteley, 2012), reflecting a trend in scientific reviews (Rachul
and Zarzeczny, 2012). Felix Hasler suggested that this exemplifies
a Gartner Hype Cycle where a technology trigger leads to a peak
of inflated expectations, followed by a trough of disillusionment,
a slope of enlightenment, and, finally, a plateau of productiv-
ity (Hasler, 2012). However, the neurosciences as a whole are
so diverse and complex that this explanatory pattern should
presently only be applied to single technologies such as fMRI.
Second, the exaggerated promises could be instances of strate-
gic behavior driven by scarce means in a competitive and uncer-
tain environment. Analyses of science communication in gen-
eral emphasized publication and commercialization pressures,
media practices, and public expectations, as feeding a “hype
pipeline” (Bubela et al., 2009; Caulfield and Condit, 2012). These
pressures may counteract basic scientific values such as hon-
esty, doubt/skepticism, or openness (IAC/IAP, 2012; DFG, 2013).
Indeed, current or past presidents of neuroscience institutions
worldwide emphasized the pressure to publish in selective high-
impact journals and achieve competitive research grants (Amara
et al., 2011) and warned against the “corrupting force” of super-
ficial standardized measures of scientific quality like the Impact
Factor (Marder et al., 2010).
The present situation of the scientific communication and
academic incentive system (see Figure 2) actually exemplifies
the behaviorists’ social engineering technology: that the environ-
ment’s reinforcement structure, the contingencies of punishment
and reward, influences behavior (Skinner, 1971). Many scholars
do what they perceive as a success-maximizing strategy in order
to receive the rewards of public attention, research funds, the
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possibility to publish in high-impact journals, and tenured posi-
tions. Critical Neuroscience contributes to understand this reward
system. However, it would be naïve to think that these forces are
restricted to the neurosciences; or that scholars actively engaging
in the sociology of neuroscience in general or Critical Neuroscience
in particular are completely immune to the present pressures and
rewards.
In a reflection on the “neuroscientific turn”, Melissa Littlefield
and Jenell Johnson discuss the possibility that we ourselves may
construct some of the risks that we subsequently propose to
manage and that not only neuroscientists, but also scholars from
the humanities and social sciences are under pressure to adapt
to an academic world with scarce resources, favoring scientific
research promising practical significance (Littlefield and Johnson,
2012). Such pressures may also affect critical scholars selecting
research questions or investigating institutions where interesting
things are happening to increase communication success at the
cost of representativity and neutrality. Neuroethics was originally
conceived to protect society from abuses of neurotechnology,
but due to occupational needs and dependencies it may also
shield neuroscience from society’s critique (Conrad and De Vries,
2011). It would be deplorable if Critical Neuroscience followed this
example. It should be noted, though, that some of its members
explicitly expressed awareness of such pressures and distanced
themselves from neuroethics (Choudhury et al., 2009; Slaby and
Choudhury, 2012).
A general Critical Science movement is necessary in order to
change the incentive structure (Nosek et al., 2012), to guarantee
scholarly autonomy and independence, and to promote behavior
in accordance with basic scientific norms and values (IAC/IAP,
2012; DFG, 2013). That is, Critical Neuroscience is necessary;
but it is not sufficient. We need to move past Sperry’s initial
proposal, to work according to principles that guarantee scholarly
and public trust in the long run instead of promising applications
as a successful fundraising strategy in the short run at the cost of
credibility. We need a Critical Science structure that also rewards
doubt, skepticism, authenticity, honesty, and reluctance to over-
simplify science or prematurely translate scientific knowledge into
practice even when this is uncomfortable. I followed a two-fold
strategy to answer Slaby’s question whether the neurosciences
indeed have the wide-ranging effects often assumed; based on
my limited analysis, both parts point in the same direction:
the underlying issues go beyond the neurosciences and beyond
Critical Neuroscience.
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